Why is it hard to solve environmental problems? The perils of institutional reductionism and institutional overload

Oran R. Young () and Olav Schram Stokke
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Oran R. Young: University of California at Santa Barbara
Olav Schram Stokke: University of Oslo

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 20, issue 1, No 2, 5-19

Abstract: Abstract Many efforts to solve environmental problems arising at the international or transnational level meet with limited success or even end in outright failure. But some efforts of this sort succeed. We construct an analytical model of such efforts leading to the conclusion that an ability to steer a course that avoids the twin perils of institutional reductionism and institutional overload is necessary to achieve success in this realm. We examine a range of risk factors or conditions likely to push processes of regime formation and implementation into one or the other of these pitfalls. We then analyze response strategies or procedures that negotiators and administrators can adopt to steer a course between the two perils, taking into account distinctive features of specific problems. We turn to marine issues to illustrate our reasoning. But the argument is applicable to the entire range of efforts to create and implement international environmental regimes.

Keywords: International regimes; Institutional overload; Institutional reductionism; Risk factors; Response strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-020-09468-6

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