John Rawls and compliance to climate change agreements: insights from a laboratory experiment

Klaudijo Klaser (), Lorenzo Sacconi and Marco Faillo ()
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Klaudijo Klaser: Università degli Studi di Trento

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2021, vol. 21, issue 3, No 11, 551 pages

Abstract: Abstract The most evident shortcoming of the international agreements on climate actions is the compliance to their prescriptions. Can John Rawls’s social contract theory help us to solve the problem? We apply the veil of ignorance decision-making setting in a sequential dictator game to study the compliance to climate change agreements and we test the model in a laboratory experiment. The veil of ignorance shows to be very powerful at inducing the subjects to converge on a sustainable intergenerational path. However, the voluntary compliance to the agreement still remains an open issue, because even small incentives to defect can undermine the compliance stability, and therefore break the whole sustainable dynamic.

Keywords: International climate change agreements; Compliance; John Rawls; Social contract theory; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D64 F64 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-021-09533-8

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