Designed to be stable: international environmental agreements revisited

Nahid Masoudi

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 22, issue 4, No 2, 659-672

Abstract: Abstract In a three-stage game, we revisit the non-cooperative coalition approaches into international environmental agreements by tackling a fundamental design flaw in these approaches. We show how a treaty can effectively remove the free-riding problem from its roots by farsightedly choosing its members’ emissions. We prove that under this approach, the grand coalition is a self-enforcing equilibrium. We will argue how the modified timing of the coalition game suggested in this article is more realistic and consistent with real-world practices. Another advantage of the farsighted rule is its simplicity and applicability to all coalition game settings, regardless of whether agents are homogeneous or heterogeneous.

Keywords: International agreements; Transboundary pollution; Strategic behaviors; Farsighted Stackelberg; Farsighted rule; F53; Q54; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-022-09574-7

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