Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh Accords

Jon Hovi () and Ivar Areklett ()

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 26 pages

Keywords: climate change; compliance; enforcement; non-cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1023/B:INEA.0000019026.02330.da

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