Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance

Jon Hovi () and Bjart Holtsmark

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2006, vol. 6, issue 2, 137-155

Keywords: Climate regime; Kyoto Protocol; Carbon taxes; Enforcement; Compliance; Political feasibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Cap-and-Trade or Carbon Taxes? The Feasibility of Enforcement and the Effects of Non-Compliance (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-006-9002-6

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