The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway

Steffen Kallbekken and Jon Hovi

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 15 pages

Keywords: Compliance; enforcement; General equilibrium modelling; International institutions; Kyoto Protocol; Punitive consequences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-006-9025-z

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