The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities

Porchiung Chou () and Cheickna Sylla ()

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2008, vol. 8, issue 4, 317-341

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Core; Endogenous coalition formation with transferable utility; International environmental agreement; Dominant cartel formation game; Exclusive membership game delta (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-008-9082-6

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