Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions

Miyuki Nagashima () and Rob Dellink

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2008, vol. 8, issue 4, 343-365

Keywords: Climate change modelling; International environmental agreements; Non-cooperative game theory; Technology spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions (2007)
Working Paper: Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions (2007)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-008-9079-1

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