Bargaining Agendas as Strategic Tools

Domenico Buccella () and Luciano Fanti ()
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Domenico Buccella: Kozminski University
Luciano Fanti: University of Pisa

The Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 2025, vol. 68, issue 1, No 5, 99-118

Abstract: Abstract In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed.

Keywords: Efficient bargaining; Right-to-manage; Cournot duopoly; Firm–union bargaining agenda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s41027-025-00565-1

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