Game-theoretic modeling of decision-making on state support for the infrastructure development in the Russian Far North

S. A. Chernogorskiy (), A. V. Kozlov () and A. B. Teslya ()
Additional contact information
S. A. Chernogorskiy: SPbPU Representative Office
A. V. Kozlov: SPbPU Representative Office
A. B. Teslya: SPbPU Representative Office

International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, 2020, vol. 11, issue 1, No 2, 10-18

Abstract: Abstract The Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is a unique geographical area, where the richest mineral reserves are located, various biological resources are presented, and there is a high human potential. However, the successful and sustainable development of the Northern territories depends largely on the state of the regional infrastructure. It provides the prerequisites for efficient production activities, the preservation of natural renewable resources, as well as favorable living conditions of the population in this territory. Thus, if one considers the regional infrastructure in a broad sense, that is, as a set of all supporting structures, transport, construction, social, innovation, and others. Then the Northern regions of Russia owing to the historical and geographical reasons generally lag behind the level of infrastructure development from the average Russian indicators. The purpose of this paper is to develop a game-theoretic model of decision-making on the allocation of public investment to support the development projects of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. The presented model can be interesting for both public and private investors in the analysis of the effectiveness of state support for the infrastructure development in the Russian Far North to improve the validity and objectivity in decision-making on regional development. The model can also be used to assess the volume of lobbying for the goals, comparison of investments and possible results by private investors.

Keywords: Arctic zone of the Russian Federation; Investments; Game theory; Interest groups; Game-theoretic model; Actors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13198-019-00798-6

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