Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways
Ram Singh ()
Indian Economic Review, 2018, vol. 53, issue 1, No 3, 29-63
Abstract During the last 2 decades, several countries have used Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs or P3) along with the traditional contracts for development of infrastructure. In this paper, we model the incentive structures induced by PPPs contracts and the traditional procurement contracts used for infrastructure. The model is used to predict outcomes under PPP contracts versus the traditional contracts. Predictions emanating from the model are tested using a data set of 313 national highway projects in India. The empirical analysis examines validity of a widely held belief that PPPs are better than the traditional contracts in terms of the cost and quality of infrastructure. We show that the construction costs are significantly higher for PPPs than the traditionally procured (non-PPP) highways. Besides, we compare the quality of PPPs with the non-PPP roads. Our analysis shows that the PPPs encourage life-cycle approach towards project costs. This effect is more pronounced for Toll-PPPs than for Non-toll-PPPs. Moreover, the quality of PPP roads is better than the traditional highways.
Keywords: PPP; P3; Procurement contracts; Toll; Roads; Life-cycle costs; Cost overruns; International Roughness Index (IRI); Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 H54 L92 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s41775-018-0032-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:inecre:v:53:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s41775-018-0032-0
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Indian Economic Review is currently edited by Uday Bhanu Sinha, Abhijit Banerji, Shreekant Gupta and J.V. Meenakshi
More articles in Indian Economic Review from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().