Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage

Rakesh Chaturvedi

Indian Economic Review, 2021, vol. 56, issue 2, No 2, 313-333

Abstract: Abstract A collective choice model of an environment where a society must allocate but cannot legally enforce property rights over an indivisible productive asset is studied. Coalitions are heterogeneous in their productive abilities and power. As such, a coalition may either produce wealth from the asset or pillage the asset from less powerful coalitions. For a wide class of production and pillage technologies, a subset of the set of efficient states is supported as a Consistent Set of Chwe (Journal of Economic Theory 63:299–325, 1994). In this Consistent Set, implicit enforcement of property rights through expectations is sufficient to make efficiency stable; explicit legal enforcement is not necessary.

Keywords: Property rights; Allocation by force; Pillage; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s41775-021-00125-6

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