Political clientelism and capture: theory and an application

Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee

Indian Economic Review, 2023, vol. 58, issue 1, No 3, 17-34

Abstract: Abstract We develop a political economy model where political clientelism co-exists with elite capture and derive its implications for targeting of local government benefits. The model helps explain targeting impacts of gender and caste based political reservations in West Bengal local governments documented by previous empirical studies. We argue these targeting patterns cannot be explained by standard political economy models, or by the presence of either elite capture or clientelism in isolation.

Keywords: Clientelism; Elite capture; Service delivery; Government accountability; Political reservations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H42 H76 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00169-w

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