Mechanism Design for Networking Research

Jun Shu () and Pravin Varaiya ()
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Jun Shu: University of California at Berkeley
Pravin Varaiya: University of California at Berkeley

Information Systems Frontiers, 2003, vol. 5, issue 1, No 5, 29-37

Abstract: Abstract We propose a pricing mechanism for statistically guaranteed service in packet-switched networks. The mechanism provides congestion control and efficient resource allocation. For users, the mechanism offers better quality and lower price. Service providers can base service and revenue models in the mechanism. We apply this mechanism to the Internet.

Keywords: pricing; game theory; mechanism design; VCG mechanism; congestion control resource allocation; economical efficiency; QoS; DiffServ; MPLS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1022085620459

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