Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

Antonio Nicita () and Matteo Rizzolli

International Review of Economics, 2012, vol. 59, issue 2, 157-174

Keywords: Transaction costs; Externalities; Theory of the firm; Property; Incomplete contracts; B15; B52; H23; K11; K12; L14; L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s12232-012-0158-9

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