Hierarchy and the size of a firm

Tobias Hiller ()
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Tobias Hiller: University Leipzig

International Review of Economics, 2021, vol. 68, issue 3, No 5, 389-404

Abstract: Abstract In this note, we apply weighted hierarchical games of cooperative game theory to the problem of optimal firm size of the firm. In particular, we analyze the influence of production technology on the size of the firm. Our note enhances previous approaches using a permission structure with equally strong relationships between predecessor and direct successors.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Hierarchy; wH $$^{\mathrm{My}}$$ My value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s12232-021-00375-z

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