Play Versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game

Chiara Nardi

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2018, vol. 4, issue 1, No 3, 106 pages

Abstract: Abstract In the context of a three-person ultimatum game featuring a proposer and two responders, this paper aims to investigate whether there are differences in bargainers’ behavior engendered by the use of the play and the strategy methods and to shed light on the role of emotions in explaining these differences. Although proposers correctly expect responders facing the play and the strategy methods to feel different emotions, our results reveal that they offer the same amount to both responders, on average. The two response methods also yield quantitatively similar acceptance rates. We thus provide further evidence that the play and the strategy methods do not significantly bias the behavior of bargainers.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Strategy method; Play method; Emotions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40797-017-0070-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:italej:v:4:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40797-017-0070-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40797

DOI: 10.1007/s40797-017-0070-2

Access Statistics for this article

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti is currently edited by Roberto Cellini

More articles in Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti from Springer, Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().