Does Random Selection of Selectors Improve the Quality of Selected Candidates? An Investigation in the Italian Academia

Daniele Checchi, Silvia Poli () and Enrico Rettore
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Silvia Poli: FBK-IRVAPP

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2018, vol. 4, issue 2, No 1, 247 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study a reform which occurred in Italy in 2008 in the formation of selection committees for qualifying as a university professor. Prior to the reform, members of the selection committees were elected by their peers, whereas after the reform they have been randomly drawn. This policy was intended to increase the equality of opportunities for candidates via a reduction in the role played by private connections to selectors. Results show that the reform was ineffective in reducing the probability contribution of being an insider, but attenuated the impact of being connected to a selector. The impact of the scientific quality of candidates on the outcome of competitions has been minimal both before and after the reform. We also find that candidates have internalised the changed environment and adapted their application strategies.

Keywords: University recruitment; Incentives; Negotiation; Formal procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I23 J45 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40797-017-0068-9

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