Internal Balance and International Competitiveness: Sports Leagues Decision Models
Michele Bisceglia (),
Assunta Gabriella Caputi,
Luca Grilli () and
Additional contact information
Michele Bisceglia: Universitá degli Studi di Bergamo
Assunta Gabriella Caputi: Università degli Studi di Foggia
Vincenzo Pacelli: Università degli Studi di Foggia
Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2018, vol. 4, issue 3, 567-578
Abstract In this paper, we consider the sports industry and in particular we focus our study on the European Football. In this market, the more the league is balanced with good teams and the more it becomes profitable. However, empirical data suggest that the top teams involved in more balanced national championships have less probability to win the international competitions. Starting from these considerations, we propose a model which examines, from the point of view of a profit-maximizer sports league, the opportunity to introduce measures in order to foster a balanced internal championship, taking into due account the competitiveness of the internal teams in the international competitions. Then we extend the model in order to include strategic interactions between more leagues in a non-cooperative game setting, and compare the Nash Equilibrium of the game with the cooperative outcome, in which the leagues maximize their joint expected profits.
Keywords: Competitive balance; European football; Non-cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40797-018-0079-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:italej:v:4:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s40797-018-0079-1
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti is currently edited by Roberto Cellini
More articles in Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti from Springer, Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().