Bargaining within the Council of the European Union: An Empirical Study on the Allocation of Funds of the European Budget

Valerio Leone Sciabolazza

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2022, vol. 8, issue 2, No 1, 227-258

Abstract: Abstract Little is known about the bargaining process of the Council of the European Union (EU), because negotiations of member countries occur behind closed doors. Using a brand-new dataset, we analyze the factors leading a country to a successful negotiation over one of the most important decisions taken by the Council every year, that for the allocation of the European budget. Important predictors of a country’s bargaining success, proxied by the quota of EU budget received, are the extent to which its votes are pivotal to form a winning coalition in the Council, its seniority, the control over the Council presidency office, and the political orientation of its government on the EU integration process. We also provide new evidence that countries advancing a similar policy agenda may benefit from each other’s effort. Finally, we demonstrate that the reforms of the Council introduced after 2004 had no significant impact on the bargaining power of countries, because their relative power to form a winning coalition was left untouched.

Keywords: Bargaining; Collective decision making; Council of the European Union; European budget (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s40797-021-00176-x

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