Voters’ Distance, Information Bias and Politicians’ Salary

David Bartolini (), Agnese Sacchi, Domenico Scalera and Alberto Zazzaro ()
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David Bartolini: International Monetary Fund

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2023, vol. 9, issue 2, No 9, 637-664

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a theoretical model exploring the role of institutional distance between voters and politicians in the provision of public goods and citizens’ welfare. Proximity eases access to information about public policies, increasing political accountability. However, rent-seeking politicians can bias information reducing citizens’ welfare. We show that the optimal distance depends on the pool of politicians, voters’ political awareness and the cost of distorting information. As these elements differ across regions, a one-size-fits-all institutional reform may be beneficial for some jurisdictions and detrimental for others. A mechanism based on politicians’ remuneration can mitigate possible welfare-decreasing effects of voter-politician proximity.

Keywords: Voter-politician distance; Government accountability; Information bias; Rent-seeking; Public good provision; Salary of politicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40797-022-00183-6

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