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Corruption and the political system: some evidence from Italian regions

Vincenzo Alfano (), Salvatore Capasso () and Lodovico Santoro ()
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Vincenzo Alfano: University of Messina
Salvatore Capasso: ISMed-CNR
Lodovico Santoro: ISMed-CNR

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2023, vol. 9, issue 2, No 10, 665-695

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the relationship between the political system and corruption from a novel perspective. The main idea is that the electoral system and competition among political parties have an impact on grand corruption, but not on petty corruption. Using Italian regional data on regional elections and corruption, the paper shows how an increase in the disproportionality outcome of an election, or an increase in the level of competition between parties, reduces grand corruption, while it has no effect on petty corruption. Yet the combined effects of the extent of proportionality in the electoral outcome and political competition may yield different final effects on grand corruption. The paper suggests major policy implications to fight corruption by fostering less distorting political systems.

Keywords: Grand corruption; Petty corruption; Political competition; Electoral formula (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 D73 H57 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40797-022-00198-z

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