Political Fragmentation and Coalition Alignment effects: Evidence from health Transfers to Italian Regions

Monica Auteri () and Alessandro Cattel
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Monica Auteri: University of Roma Tre
Alessandro Cattel: University of Roma Tre

Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2023, vol. 9, issue 3, No 13, 1216 pages

Abstract: Abstract Do government parties positively discriminate in favor of swing or aligned sub-national units while allocating public resources? This paper integrates these two strands of the literature and makes a new contribution by incorporating the insightful perspective of the political fragmentation approach. Using a dataset of Italian regions between 2001 and 2011 constructed from primary sources and a new index of fractionalization, based on Golosov (Party Politics 16(2):171–192), we empirically find that it is the fragmentation of the aligned recipient government that affects the final amount of resources, rather than the alignment itself. Quasi-formula-based grants do not remove the arbitrariness that allows for politically motivated targeting.

Keywords: Distributive politics; Multi-tier system; Resource sharing formula; Grants; Political processes; Government expenditures and health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H51 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40797-022-00205-3

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