The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning

Radha Iyengar () and Giovanni Mastrobuoni ()

IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 2014, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-31

Abstract: H55, I18, I38, G22 Copyright Iyengar and Mastrobuoni; licensee Springer. 2014

Keywords: Disability insurance; Principal-agent; Social security administration; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Political Economy of the Disability Insurance: Theory and Evidence of Gubernatorial Learning
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DOI: 10.1186/2193-9004-3-16

IZA Journal of Labor Policy is currently edited by Juan F. Jimeno, David Neumark and Núria Rodríguez-Planas

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