Eine spieltheoretische Analyse des Länderfinanzausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Reiner Wolff ()

Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, 2007, vol. 27, issue 1, 89-101

Abstract: The German system of financial equalization among the country’s 16 federal states is built into a cooperative game. In this game, pairs of disjoint coalitions of players may form alliances which harmonize tax revenues among its members according to the procedural regulations of the law. The game solution generates a hypothetical transfer scheme for the set of all 16 states with reference to the years 1998 and 2002. Deviations from the respective empirical schemes are interpreted as a hidden progressivity which comes mainly at the cost of the richer states. The impact on the overall transfer volume amounts to about 28% in both years. Similar results are to be expected for the new system of financial equalization which started in 2005. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2007

Keywords: Finanzausgleich; kooperative Spiele; Shapley-Wert (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s10037-006-0012-1

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