Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line

Lili Mei (), Deshi Ye () and Yong Zhang ()
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Lili Mei: Zhejiang University
Deshi Ye: Zhejiang University
Yong Zhang: Chinese Academy of Sciences

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018, vol. 36, issue 2, No 13, 549-571

Abstract: Abstract In the facility location game on a line, there are some agents who have fixed locations on the line where an obnoxious facility will be placed. The objective is to maximize the social welfare, e.g., the sum of distances from the facility to all agents. On collecting location information, agents may misreport the locations so as to stay far away from the obnoxious facility. In this paper, strategy-proof mechanisms are designed and the approximation ratio is used to measure the performances of the strategy-proof mechanisms. Two objective functions, maximizing the sum of squares of distances (maxSOS) and maximizing the sum of distances (maxSum), have been considered. For maxSOS, a randomized 5/3-approximated strategy-proof mechanism is proposed, and the lower bound of the approximation ratio is proved to be at least 1.042. For maxSum, the lower bound of the approximation ratio of the randomized strategy-proof mechanism is proved to be 1.077. Moreover, a general model is considered that each agent may have multiple locations on the line. For the objective functions maxSum and maxSOS, both deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms are investigated, and the deterministic mechanisms are shown to be best possible.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Strategy proof; Facility location game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-016-0105-x

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