Congestion games with mixed objectives

Matthias Feldotto (), Lennart Leder () and Alexander Skopalik ()
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Matthias Feldotto: Paderborn University
Lennart Leder: Paderborn University
Alexander Skopalik: Paderborn University

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018, vol. 36, issue 4, No 4, 1145-1167

Abstract: Abstract We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergence of improvement dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of the decision problem. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Congestion games; Bottleneck congestion games; Pure Nash equilibrium; Existence; Convergence; Complexity; Approximation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y

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