Pareto optimal equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing

György Dósa () and Leah Epstein ()
Additional contact information
György Dósa: University of Pannonia
Leah Epstein: University of Haifa

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2019, vol. 37, issue 3, No 3, 827-847

Abstract: Abstract Bin packing problems deal with packing a set of items with sizes in (0, 1] into a minimum number of subsets, called bins, whose total sizes are no larger than 1. We study a class of bin packing games where the cost of an item packed into a bin with k items is $$\frac{1}{k}$$1k, that is, the cost sharing of each bin is uniform. We study the quality of strictly Pareto optimal equilibria and weakly Pareto optimal equilibria for these games.

Keywords: Bin packing; Nash equilibrium; Selfish players; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10878-018-0323-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:37:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10878-018-0323-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer.com/journal/10878

DOI: 10.1007/s10878-018-0323-5

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization is currently edited by Thai, My T.

More articles in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().