Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences

Jorge Arenas () and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez
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Jorge Arenas: University of Chile

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2023, vol. 45, issue 2, No 8, 8 pages

Abstract: Abstract We reexamine the existence of stable solutions in a class of three-sided matching problems previously studied by Zhang and Zhong (J Comb Optim 42:928–245, 2021). The sets of participants are U, V, and W. Agents in U have strict preferences defined on V, agents in V have strict preferences defined on W, and agents in W have strict preferences defined on $$U\times V$$ U × V . In this framework, we show that a weakly stable matching may not exist.

Keywords: Matching markets; Stability; Mixed preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-023-00990-2

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