Pseudo-Shapley value for weak games of threats

Daniel Li Li () and Erfang Shan ()
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Daniel Li Li: Shanghai Business School
Erfang Shan: School of Management, Shanghai University

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2025, vol. 49, issue 5, No 7, 9 pages

Abstract: Abstract For a real number $$\omega $$ ω , a weak game of threats (N, v) consists of a set N of n players and a function $$v:2^N\rightarrow \mathbb {R}$$ v : 2 N → R such that $$\omega v(\emptyset )+(1-\omega )v(N)=0$$ ω v ( ∅ ) + ( 1 - ω ) v ( N ) = 0 , where $$v(\emptyset )\ne 0$$ v ( ∅ ) ≠ 0 possibly. It is shown that there exists a unique value with respect to $$\omega $$ ω for weak games of threats that satisfies efficiency, linearity, symmetry and the null player property.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Weak game of threats; Pseudo-Shapley value; 91A12; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-025-01319-x

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