An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing

Xin Chen (), Qingqin Nong () and Qizhi Fang ()
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Xin Chen: Ocean University of China
Qingqin Nong: Ocean University of China
Qizhi Fang: Ocean University of China

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, No 0, 21 pages

Abstract: Abstract Selfish bin packing can be viewed as the non-cooperative version of bin packing problem, where every item is a selfish agent and wants to minimize his sharing cost with the other items packing in the same bin. In this paper, we focus on designing a new mechanism (a payoff rule) for selfish bin packing, called modified Dutch treatment mechanism. We first show that the pure Nash equilibrium exists and it can be obtained in polynomial time. We then prove that under the new mechanism, the price of anarchy is between 1.47407 and 1.4748, improving the known results.

Keywords: Selfish bin packing; Mechanism; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy (PoA) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-019-00476-0

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