Compensation-based stock trading by corporate executive and aggregate management ownership of the firm: Some additional evidence

Zahid Iqbal () and Shekar Shetty ()

Journal of Economics and Finance, 2004, vol. 28, issue 2, 270-284

Abstract: Managers place a low value on equity-based compensation because it exposes them to the risk of the firm. Such undervaluation and the need to achieve diversification may force a manager to sell his own stock of the firm in response to equity-based awards. In this paper we examine whether such stock selling by an executive depends on the aggregate level of management ownership of the firm. We argue that stock selling occurs at a high level of aggregate ownership where an executive has a low probability of being replaced. Our findings support this “management ownership” argument of compensation-based stock trading. One implication is that the board's effort to minimize agency conflicts becomes less effective once aggregate ownership increases to a certain threshold level. (JEL G30, G32) Copyright Springer 2004

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02761617

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