Payroll tax incidence when the tax varies by jurisdiction: The case of the U.S. unemployment insurance tax

Kevin Murphy ()

Journal of Economics and Finance, 2006, vol. 30, issue 2, 198-204

Abstract: Standard treatment of payroll tax incidence suggests that labor, both because of inelastic supply and because workers value the benefit financed by the tax, bears most of the tax. This note considers the special case of the U.S. unemployment insurance tax, which is a payroll tax that varies by jurisdiction (states). The model set forth in this paper allows for differing degrees of both labor mobility and substitutability between types of labor and capital. Contrary to the standard treatment, this paper predicts that some types of labor will avoid this particular type of payroll tax completely. Copyright Springer 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02761485

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