Corruption perceptions versus corruption incidence: Competition for rents across Russian regions

Veronika Belousova, Rajeev Goel and Iikka Korhonen

Journal of Economics and Finance, 2016, vol. 40, issue 1, 172-187

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of different competitions for favors on the prevalence and perceptions of corruption across Russian regions. Results show that while greater general competition (measured by regional population size), increases both perceived and actual corruption, competition among enterprises only increases corruption perceptions, while competition among government employees increases actual, but not perceived, corruption. Privatization activity and unemployment fail to affect either measure of corruption. Finally, the effects of urbanization differ on perceived and actual corruption. Besides Russia, these findings are somewhat unique to the broader literature. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: Corruption perceptions; Corruption incidence; Russia; Government; Competition; K42; O5; P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Causes of Corruption in Russia: A Disaggregated Analysis (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:40:y:2016:i:1:p:172-187

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DOI: 10.1007/s12197-014-9298-y

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