The relative CEO to employee pay for luck

Yixi Ning (), Chien-Ping Chen () and Yingxu Kuang ()
Additional contact information
Yixi Ning: University of Houston - Victoria
Chien-Ping Chen: University of Houston - Victoria
Yingxu Kuang: University of Houston - Victoria

Journal of Economics and Finance, 2024, vol. 48, issue 3, No 15, 924-946

Abstract: Abstract In this study, we fill the void in the literature by examining relative CEO to employee pay for luck and pay asymmetry phenomena over 72 years from 1949 to 2020. We find that CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of the pay exist for CEOs as well as median employees. However, CEOs have a more robust pay for luck and a more pronounced pay asymmetry than median employees. Furthermore, we find that the corporate pay-related regulations implemented in the 2000s have achieved their intended goal of mitigating pay inequity between CEOs and median employees. It lowers the degree of CEO pay for luck and asymmetry compared to median employees. Our findings shed new insights on CEO and employee pay for non-performance to academia, regulators, and shareholders.

Keywords: CEO pay for luck and asymmetry; Employee pay for luck and asymmetry; CEO pay ratio (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 J31 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12197-024-09682-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:48:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s12197-024-09682-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/12197/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s12197-024-09682-x

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics and Finance is currently edited by James Payne

More articles in Journal of Economics and Finance from Springer, Academy of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().