Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives

Kojun Hamada

The Japanese Economic Review, 2018, vol. 69, issue 1, No 5, 59-68

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.

Keywords: D43; H42; H44; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1111/jere.12143

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