A Mixed Duopoly with Switching Costs
The Japanese Economic Review, 2019, vol. 70, issue 2, No 5, 235-257
Abstract We examine the effects of switching costs in a two-period Hotelling-type model where a profit-maximising private firm competes with a welfare-maximising public firm. We show that, in contrast with the case in which both firms are private, where switching costs raise prices in both periods, in the mixed duopoly they raise prices in the second period but reduce them in the first period. Moreover, the first-period price reduction is of such magnitude that switching costs reduce firms’ profits and raise consumer welfare. We also find that switching costs affect the consequences of privatisation in favour of firms and against consumers.
Keywords: D43; L13; L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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