Collusion and Information Exchange

Yu Awaya
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Yu Awaya: University of Rochester

The Japanese Economic Review, 2019, vol. 70, issue 3, No 11, 394-402

Abstract: Abstract Antitrust authorities view that exchange of individual firms’ sales data is more anti-competitive than that of aggregate sales data. In this paper, I survey antitrust implications of such inter-firm information exchange. I argue that both types of information exchange are anti-competitive under some circumstances. More precisely, I compare profits when each type of information exchange is allowed to that when firms can only observe their own sales (Stigler’s secret price-cutting model), and the former is bigger than the latter. I also provide a general method to bound the equilibrium profits without such information exchange.

Keywords: C73; D43; D83; L12; L13; L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1111/jere.12241

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