Introduction to fundamental issues in game theory and market design

Michihiro Kandori and Takashi Ui ()
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Michihiro Kandori: The University of Tokyo
Takashi Ui: Hitotsubashi University

The Japanese Economic Review, 2020, vol. 71, issue 1, No 1, 5 pages

Abstract: Abstract We introduce this special issue, which collects recent developments in game theory and market design. The first half of the special issue consists of five papers on incomplete information games, most of which contribute to the study of robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. The second half of the special issue is devoted to two papers on matching and market design, which provide extension of matching in some important directions. This introduction gives a summary of the special issue by briefly discussing each paper.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s42973-019-00008-9

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