Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly

Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang and Cheng-Hau Peng ()
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Ray-Yun Chang: Chinese Culture University
Hong Hwang: National Taiwan University

The Japanese Economic Review, 2020, vol. 71, issue 3, No 4, 446 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper employs a two-country Cournot model to investigate the protection and welfare effects of an antidumping (AD) duty and a price-undertaking policy under different dumping measures (i.e., injury margin and dumping margin) in a differentiated duopoly. We show that the welfare levels of the host country and the world as a whole are lower under a price-undertaking policy than an AD-duty policy. However, the former is superior to the AD-duty policy in terms of protection. These results are robust even if the firms engage in Bertrand competition.

Keywords: Antidumping policies; Dumping measures; Market protection; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s42973-019-00024-9

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