Keeping players in the dark: benefits of private monitoring

Takuo Sugaya ()
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Takuo Sugaya: Stanford GSB

The Japanese Economic Review, 2025, vol. 76, issue 3, No 4, 539-564

Abstract: Abstract I survey the benefits of keeping players in the dark about payoff- or strategy-relevant variables in dynamic games. Topics include repeated games with private monitoring, stochastic games with incomplete information, and repeated/stochastic games with an omniscient mediator. I emphasize how keeping players in the dark reduces their deviation gains and hence possibly expands the set of equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: Repeated games; Private monitoring; Blind game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s42973-025-00221-9

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