What economists should contribute to Japanese competition policy

Reiko Aoki ()
Additional contact information
Reiko Aoki: Japan Fair Trade Commission

The Japanese Economic Review, 2025, vol. 76, issue 3, No 2, 523-535

Abstract: Abstract Japan’s competition policy is based on its Antimonopoly Act and complementary acts, including the Subcontract Act. The enforcement of competition policy has incorporated economic thinking and the “rule of reason” as well as econometrics. Economists have tended to neglect or criticize unique aspects of Japan’s competition policy, such as its abuse of the superior bargaining position concept and the Subcontract Act. Recently, however, global interest in digital platforms and aggressive merger controls have led to an increased focus on bargaining power. In this study, I explain both Japanese competition law and cases involving the abuse of a superior bargaining position to clarify the economic issues and present a possible framework for analysis of these issues.

Keywords: Competition policy; Antitrust; Antimonopoly law; Abuse of superior bargaining position; Subcontract Act; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s42973-025-00226-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:76:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s42973-025-00226-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer.com/journal/42973

DOI: 10.1007/s42973-025-00226-4

Access Statistics for this article

The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Michihiro Kandori

More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().