On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

Giorgio Negroni () and Lidia Bagnoli
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Giorgio Negroni: University of Bologna
Lidia Bagnoli: Ministry of Economy and Finance

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2017, vol. 12, issue 3, No 8, 635-667

Abstract: Abstract We study the evolutionary origin of a social norm of the kind “cooperate frequently and share fully” observed in modern hunter–gatherers. In order to do this, a two-stage game in which a pie has first to be produced and then divided is proposed. We assume that the bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior and to the degree of property rights protection. We show that, when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists, a norm of investment and a norm of division coevolve supporting the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The conditions needed for norms to coevolve depend on whether property rights over the fruits of one’s own independent investment are secured or not.

Keywords: Evolution; Social norms; Stochastically stable equilibrium; Modern hunter–gatherer societies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D83 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-016-0180-1

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