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Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job

André Veski () and Kaire Põder ()
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André Veski: Tallinn University of Technology

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2018, vol. 13, issue 3, 615-640

Abstract: Abstract We study a simple agent-based model of a decentralized matching market game in which agents (workers or job seekers) make proposals to other agents (firms) in order to be matched to a position within the firm. The aggregate result of agents interactions can be summarised in the form of a Beveridge curve, which determines the relationship between unmatched agents, unemployed job seekers and vacancies in firms. We open the black box of matching technology, by modelling how agents behave (make proposals) according to their information perception. We observe more efficient results—in the form of a downward shift of the Beverage curve in the case of simple zero-intelligent agents. Our comparative statics indicate that market conditions, such as the heterogeneity of agents’ preferences, will also shift the Beveridge curve downwards. Moreover, market thickness affects movement along the Beverage curve. Movement right-down along the curve if there is an increasing number of agents compared to positions within firms. Furthermore, we show that frictions in re-matching, such as commitment to a match, could be another factor shifting the Beveridge curve toward the origin.

Keywords: Matching market; Computational experiment; Decentralised matching; Job search; Beveridge curve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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