Aspects of complexity in citizen–bureaucrat corruption: an agent-based simulation model

Jana Zausinová (), Martin Zoričak, Marcel Vološin and Vladimír Gazda ()
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Jana Zausinová: Technical University of Košice
Martin Zoričak: Technical University of Košice
Marcel Vološin: Technical University of Košice

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2020, vol. 15, issue 2, No 8, 527-552

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, the complexity-based approach is used to analyse corruption and its internal economics and dynamics. To better understand the drivers of corruption, we employ an agent-based model with heterogeneous agents (bureaucrats and citizens), the interactions of which determine the level of corruption in a society. The emergence of a prevailing social norm of corruption is shown to be significantly influenced by the initial conditions (i.e., history and habits). A cost analysis demonstrates that a relatively limited financial investment is required for the phase transition from the corrupt to the non-corrupt state. The concept of opportunity costs is used to express the value of information shared within an agent’s social group that improves agent decision-making. Incomplete information and uncertainty in the legal system help to reduce corruption by promoting a fear of engaging in corruption in a society. The results of this research may offer useful insights for informing an effective anti-corruption policy.

Keywords: Corruption; Complexity; Agent-based model; Phase transition; Decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-019-00240-x

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