Does social learning promote cooperation in social dilemmas?

Ozgur Aydogmus (), Hasan Cagatay () and Erkan Gürpinar
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Ozgur Aydogmus: Social Sciences University of Ankara
Hasan Cagatay: Social Sciences University of Ankara

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2020, vol. 15, issue 3, No 4, 633-648

Abstract: Abstract In this study, we analyze how emergence of cooperation is related to social learning. Cooperation is an example of social behavior. It is frequency-dependent that is the success of a particular behavior depends on the number of individuals adopting each behavioral trait. We study how social learning can affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas represented by two well-known games: Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift (SD). We show that, in the PD game, increase in the proportion of social learners leads to the alleviation of the social dilemma. Whereas, in the SD game increasing the proportion of social learners does not always lead to the alleviation of the social dilemma, that is there is no simple monotonic relation between social learning and the weakening of the social dilemma.

Keywords: Social learning; Social dilemmas; Evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-019-00254-5

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