Decision-facilitating information in hidden-action setups: an agent-based approach

Stephan Leitner and Friederike Wall ()
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Friederike Wall: University of Klagenfurt

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2021, vol. 16, issue 2, No 5, 323-358

Abstract: Abstract The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed (Holmström in Bell J Econ 10(1):74, 1979). However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and also implicit assumptions about the information of the contracting parties. This paper relaxes key assumptions regarding the availability of information included in the hidden-action model in order to study whether and, if so, how fast the optimal sharing rule is achieved and how this is affected by the various types of information employed in the principal-agent relation. Our analysis particularly focuses on information about the environment and about feasible actions for the agent. We follow an approach to transfer closed-form mathematical models into agent-based computational models and show that the extent of information about feasible options to carry out a task only has an impact on performance if decision makers are well informed about the environment, and that the decision whether to perform exploration or exploitation when searching for new feasible options only affects performance in specific situations. Having good information about the environment, on the contrary, appears to be crucial in almost all situations.

Keywords: Management control; Complexity economics; Agent-based simulation; Information systems; Information system sophistication; Search strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 D83 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Decision-facilitating information in hidden-action setups: An agent-based approach (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-020-00297-z

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