Can boundedly rational sellers learn to play Nash?

Roger Waldeck and Eric Darmon

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2006, vol. 1, issue 2, 147-169

Keywords: Imperfect information; Price competition; Price dispersion; Search market equilibrium; Reinforcement learning; Numerical computation; D43; D83; C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-006-0009-4

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