Heterogeneity in the resistance to learning

Haydée Lugo

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2013, vol. 8, issue 2, 267-276

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the effect of heterogeneity in the recently introduced “resistance to learning” (Jiménez et al. in Eur Phys J B 71:273–280, 2009a ). In the context of the spatial Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma, the resistance to learning has become a key mechanism for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in a wide range of cost regimes. We extend the model to the case in which different individuals may have different levels of resistance. From non-cooperative initial states, the existence of heterogeneity in the resistance affects the cooperative behavior of unconditional imitators. These unconditional imitators, i.e., fast learners or individuals without resistance can achieve due to their interactions with gradual learners significant levels of cooperation. Our results confirm in one of its form the impact of heterogeneity and its role as a fundamental mechanism in promoting the emergence of cooperation. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Resistance to learning; Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma; Structured population; Heterogeneity; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:8:y:2013:i:2:p:267-276

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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-012-0094-5

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