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Taking games: a meta-analysis

Alexandre Flage ()
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Alexandre Flage: Université de Lorraine, Université de Strasbourg, CNRS

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2024, vol. 10, issue 2, No 5, 255-278

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents the first meta-analysis of the ‘Taking Game,’ a variant of the Dictator Game where participants take money from recipients instead of giving. Upon analyzing data from 39 experiments, which include 123 effect sizes and 7262 offers made by dictators, we discovered a significant framing effect: dictators are more generous in the Taking Game than in the Dictator Game (Cohen’s d = 0.26, p

Keywords: Taking Game; Dictator Game; Framing effects; Meta-analysis; Multiple regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00155-1

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